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20 years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which introduced the framework of ‘Closer Cooperation’ as the 
precursor of today’s ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ (EnC), and 10 
years after revamping this framework with the Treaty of Lis-
bon, 2019 is the right moment to take stock of the accomplish-
ments and shortcomings of a procedure that was once praised 
as the European Union’s (EU) ‘magic formula’ towards differen-
tiated integration (de la Serre & Wallace 1997: 5). Best under-
stood as a generalised (applicable to a large number of policy 
fields) and standardised (prescribing a uniform and transparent 
process) framework of ‘controlled’ flexibility, EnC allows a sub-
group of EU Member States (MS) to continue a legislative pro-
cedure that has been blocked in the Union’s normal settings. 
‘Fenced in’ by a common procedural set-up and substantive 
limits of application and range, connoting an ‘inflexibilisation’ 
of the supposed flexibility clause, EnC’s promise is that political 
unity, legal homogeneity and institutional coherence inside the 
Treaties is reconcilable with varying degrees of MS cooperation 
in different policy areas. With not even a single recourse to EnC 
between 1999 and 2010 but repeated instances of differenti-
ated institution-building outside the Treaties (e.g. Fiscal Com-
pact) since the financial and sovereign debt crisis, the de facto 
impact of this promise must be called into question. Moreover, 
the implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO) in defence projects in 2017 – an additional, single-topic 
Treaty framework allowing for subgroup integration – has re-
cently overshadowed debates on differentiated integration in 
the EU. 
Against this backdrop, this policy brief evaluates the EnC by, 
first, providing a brief introduction to the subject before pre-
senting three core insights from the analysis of the legal provi-
sions governing EnC since the Lisbon Treaty, particularly focus-
sing on the role of the European Parliament. Subsequently, 
three lessons regarding the cases of EnC ‘realised’ so far will be 
outlined. Finally, these insights will be condensed in three pol-
icy recommendations with the aim to facilitate and improve the 
future use of EnC in the EU.  
 
Basis and basics of Enhanced Cooperation 
The procedure establishing an EnC among a subgroup of MS is 
best understood by separating it into two stages, an ‘authorisa-
tion stage’ and a stage in which ‘implementing act(s)’ are 
adopted. Every EnC initiative, pursuable by at least nine MS only 
after manifest deadlock of a legislative file in the standard pro-
ceedings, needs to be authorised by Qualitative Majority Voting 
(QMV) in the Council of Ministers as a whole, following a pro-
posal by the European Commission. In a second step, the actual 
legislative act is decided upon by the participating MS, thus im-
plementing the EnC with regulations/directives binding only for 
this ‘in-group’ of EU members. It is important to emphasise that 
in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) con-
sensual rules for EnC apply at both stages. 
So far, four cases of EnC have successfully gone through both 
phases, namely 
1. the Law Applicable to Divorce and Legal Separation (‘Rome 
III Regulation’) in 2010; 
2. the European Patent with Unitary Effect (‘Unitary Patent’) in 
2012; 
3. the Property Regimes Rules for International Couples in 
2016; 
4. the European Public Prosecutor's Office (‘EPPO’) in 2017, 
Executive Summary 
> In the framework of Enhanced Cooperation in the 
EU less than a handful of policy projects have been 
realised so far. 
> Procedural and substantive bottlenecks in the rel-
evant Treaty provisions streamline the frame-
work’s application towards special legislative pro-
cedure in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. 
> The framework can substantially be improved by: 
> changing the incentive structure that Enhanced Co-
operation is embedded in; 
> reducing the complexity in the realm of ‘subgroup 
integration’ in the EU (especially by integrating 
PESCO into the Enhanced Cooperation frame-
work); 
> strengthening the role of the European Parliament 
in the respective procedures. 
 
This policy brief is based on a study commissioned by the Euro-
pean Parliament (see ‘Further Reading’ section). 
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while the Financial Transaction Tax (‘FTT’) was authorised in 
2013 without any subsequent implementing acts. 
 
Legal word: Interpreting the Treaty provisions 
Prominently anchoring the general framework of EnC in Art. 20 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) in addition to the ‘more hidden’ 
provisions of Art. 326-334 Treaty of the Functioning of European 
Union (TFEU), the MS as the ‘masters’ of the Treaties underlined 
their intention to establish EnC as the default procedure for fu-
ture differentiated integration. Already foreseen in the Constitu-
tional Treaty (Art. I-44), this symbolical, judicially irrelevant up-
grading indicates that – albeit being a ‘non-starter’ in the decade 
post-Amsterdam – EnC was at that time still considered as the 
most promising solution to the inevitable tensions in a growing 
Union. 
Insight 1: EnC’s bias towards special legislative procedures   
At the most basic level, EnC cannot arise ‘out of procedural void’, 
understood here as the discretion of a single driver who recog-
nises a problem and suggests a solution (like, for example, the 
Commission in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP)). In fact, 
the consideration of EnC always constitutes a preliminary end of 
a legislative procedure, in the form of a failure to agree on a spe-
cific policy within the Community orthodoxy. Even the political 
leaders in the European Council, who initiated and agreed upon 
most forms of differentiation in the past, cannot launch the pro-
cedure ‘from scratch’. This is reflected in the notion of “last re-
sort” in Art. 20(2) TEU, which must be considered as the funda-
mental prerequisite of any further action.  
The crucial question is obviously: when can a ‘failure to agree’ be 
ascertained? Or, to put it differently, how long and with which 
efforts should MS try to find a common ground preventing the 
application of EnC as an ultima ratio? The explanation to the ‘last 
resort rule’, introduced by the Nice Treaty and retained after-
wards, leaves broad room for interpretation (“reasonable pe-
riod”) and was in the case of the Unitary Patent challenged by 
Spain and Italy before the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion. In its judgement on the joined cases C-274/11 and C-295/11 
(16 April 2013), the Court pointed to “the inability” of the Council 
to find agreement, indicated by the impossibility “to adopt such 
legislation in the foreseeable future” (§50).  While this ‘inability’ 
is to be determined by the Council itself, the Court only examines 
if the Council has “carefully and impartially” (§54) examined the 
situation. A formal role for the European Parliament is not fore-
seen at this stage save its (potential) involvement in the failed 
legislative procedure before the final rejection in the Council. 
However, it must be noted that under the current rules EnC is 
most likely to emerge in the contexts of unanimity decisions in 
the Council, generally implicating a side-lined Parliament in the 
first place.  
Insight 2: EnC’s thrust away from the single market 
The specification of “scope and objectives” of the EnC endeavour 
to be presented by a pioneering subgroup (Art. 329(1) TFEU), 
read together with the second paragraph of Art. 326 TFEU, can 
be considered as the tightest substantive bottleneck in the 
whole process: “Such cooperation shall not undermine the inter-
nal market or economic, social and territorial cohesion. It shall 
not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between 
Member States, nor shall it distort competition between them” 
(see also Thym 2018: 857). Although ‘not undermining the inter-
nal market’ is semantically less restrictive than, for example, ‘not 
affecting the acquis communautaire’ (a provision governing EnC 
before the Treaty of Nice), this paragraph imposes a complex and 
protracted justification duty of answering the question of how a 
policy does not undermine the four freedoms (Peers 2017: 79). 
Dauntingly difficult in general, it is almost impossible if the sub-
group tries to ‘save’ a rejected, single market-related policy in 
the first place. By a filter towards shared competences, EnC is 
streamlined away from the single market, and towards, for ex-
ample, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). More generally, this 
thrust is already rooted in the limitation to activate EnC only in 
“the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences” (Art. 
20(1) TEU).  
Insight 3: EnC’s ‘passerelle clause’ is less favourable than it seems 
Following the supranational logic of the consent procedure, the 
Parliament is granted the role of a veto player between the Com-
mission’s elaborated proposal to authorise EnC and the Council’s 
voting on the issue. The Parliament decides by a simple majority 
of the votes cast. This implies that there is no additional quorum 
of the majority of all members of the Parliament. In addition to 
the expansion of this veto right to all areas save CFSP, Art. 333 
TFEU was introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon: “Where a provi-
sion of the Treaties which may be applied in the context of en-
hanced cooperation stipulates that the Council shall adopt acts 
under a special legislative procedure, the Council, acting unani-
mously in accordance with the arrangements laid down in Article 
330, may adopt a decision stipulating that it will act under the 
ordinary legislative procedure. The Council shall act after con-
sulting the European Parliament” (Art. 333(2) TFEU). Read in 
combination with Declaration 40 annexed to the Treaties, this 
strategically crucial, intermediate veto position of the Parlia-
ment has been – prima facie – leveraged substantively: “Mem-
ber States may indicate, when they make a request to establish 
enhanced cooperation, if they intend already at that stage to 
make use of Article 333 providing for the extension of qualified 
majority voting or to have recourse to the ordinary legislative 
procedure” (Declaration 40, annexed to the TFEU). 
Adopting the so-called Bresso/Brok report (§40), the European 
Parliament underlined that it “[i]s determined to implement fully 
the Treaty provisions on enhanced cooperation by committing 
not to give its consent to any new enhanced cooperation pro-
posals unless the participating Member States commit to acti-
vate the special ‘passerelle clause’ enshrined in Article 333 TFEU 
to switch from unanimity to QMV, and from a special to the or-
dinary legislative procedure.” However, this favourable setting 
for the Parliament is complicated, protracted and restrained by 
national legislation and jurisdiction of MS, most prominently by 
the ‘Lisbon judgement’ of the German Constitutional Court, 
binding Germany’s assent to the activation of Art. 333 TFEU to 
the respective decisions of the Bundestag (lower chamber) and 
Bundesrat (upper/federal chamber). 
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Real world: Lessons from 4 ½ cases of Enhanced Cooperation 
Before turning to the key lessons derived from the 4½ cases of 
the EnC implemented so far, a couple of more general observa-
tions on these cases, partly illustrated in Figure 1, need to be 
considered: 
 Eurozone cleavage: the core of MS participating in all cases 
of EnC (including FTT) consists of Eurozone members only; 
excluding the FTT only one non-Euro MS belongs to ‘the core’ 
(namely Bulgaria); 
 Geographical cleavage: Northern as well as Central and East-
ern European MS are less likely to participate in EnC than 
Western and Southern European MS (particularly the six 
founding members); 
 Opt-out periphery: MS with primary law opt-outs (UK, Ireland 
and Denmark) constitute – together with Poland – the pe-
riphery of EnC participation; 
 Franco-German tandem: the two biggest MS are not only 
part of the EnC but also participated in the respective EnC 
initiatives from the very beginning; they can therefore be 
considered as a cross-cutting driver of EnC. 
 
Figure 1: Spaghetti bowl of EnC 
          Source: Own elaboration 
 
Lesson 1: 4 ½ cases – ‘EnC inventory’ is sobering  
The – so far – sobering inventory of EnC consists of:  
 Two ‘conflict-of-national-law solution schemes’ already at 
work (Rome III Regulation and Property Regime Rules), nei-
ther of them adding ‘legislative substance’ on the EU level 
(for a detailed description of these and the other cases, see 
European Parliamentary Research Service 2018); 
 The Unitary Patent hinging on the protracted ratification of 
an accompanying, additional intergovernmental treaty es-
tablishing the necessary Unitary Patent Court outside the 
Treaties, which is ‘stuck’ in the German Bundestag. Moreo-
ver, while participating in the EnC, Poland did not sign the 
Unitary Patent Court treaty;  
 The EPPO, established in a one-time-only, short-track EnC 
procedure (Art. 86 TFEU), in the early phase of its institution-
alisation and not operational before late 2020. The initial 
proposal was accompanied by 11 yellow cards of national 
parliaments via the Early Warning Mechanism;  
 The FTT is authorised only and an agreement on the imple-
menting acts cannot be expected in the foreseeable future. 
In all these cases, the procedure from the initial proposal to the 
implementing act was protracted (duration between 4 and 12 
years, FTT excluded). 
Lesson 2: ‘Legal word insights’ reflected in reality 
In line with above insights, it can be noted that: 
a. All 4 ½ cases developed out of unsuccessful special legislative 
procedures after the failed attempts to achieve unanimity in 
the Council; 
b. 3 of the 4 ½ cases fall into the area of JHA, officially called 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice;  
c. These 3 JHA cases face a rather smooth implementation 
without any major legal challenges as in the case of the Uni-
tary Patent, which was challenged before the CJEU as it falls 
in the field of legal approximation in the single market. 
Moreover, until now only limited ‘inter-EnC dynamics’, under-
stood as the convergence of the participating MS in adjacent or 
similar EnC policies, can be observed (see, for example, overlaps 
between the Rome III and the Property Regimes group). 
Lesson 3: ‘EnC’s maturing’ as maturing of MS attitudes 
However, the most crucial impact of the implementation of EnC 
framework as a whole in the post-Lisbon decade is that it actually 
has been implemented. This non-trivial result has to be seen in 
the light of persistent attitudes of MS: the ‘EnC’s maturing’ can 
– with great caution – be understood as a maturing of MS gov-
ernments’ stances towards EnC as not only a legal but also a le-
gitimate tool of problem-solving at the EU level. Reluctant to 
make use of EnC under the Amsterdam/Nice provisions, MS have 
started to consider EnC as a problem-solving vehicle, not in the 
sense of mainstreaming but in the sense of daring to ‘test the 
waters’. Beginning with – from a sovereignty and integrationist 
point of view – rather benign pioneering projects with neu-
tral/no externalities (like Property Regime Rules or Rome III, see 
Kroll & Leuffen 2015: 358ff.) to a more delicate but with 26 par-
ticipating MS almost ‘complete’ subgroup (Unitary Patent) and 
to a project with a clear danger of free-riding outsiders (EPPO), 
the attitudes of MS are evolving. Or to put it differently, the 
problem-solving propensity of MS seems to become more ‘ad-
venturous’ with regard to a ‘generalised’ and ‘standardised’ 
framework of differentiated integration, even if it is difficult to 
extrapolate this observation and embark on any long-term pre-
diction in this regard. 
Recommendations: Enhancing ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ 
To conclude, several concrete proposals can be made on how to 
facilitate the usage and improve the functioning, of the EnC 
framework, largely based on the insights and lessons presented 
above. For proposals 2 and 3 changes of the respective Treaty 
provisions would be necessary. 
Proposal 1: Changing the incentive structure 
EnC’s central incentive is that the participating MS “may make 
use of [the Union’s] institutions” (Art. 20(1) TEU) to implement 
and govern their endeavour after its approval. Preventing the 
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use of EU institutions/administrations for any form of differenti-
ated integration outside the Treaties will reinforce EnC’s unique 
selling proposition. As a norm, the European Council should re-
frain from searching for legal constructions outside the EU Trea-
ties (such as the European Stability Mechanism). Moreover, in-
creasing the synergies of EnC projects in adjacent policy fields – 
by allowing for additional financial and administrative incentives 
for participating MS in these cases – would add attractiveness 
and coherence at the same time. 
Proposal 2: Reducing complexity 
The variations of differentiated integration within the EU should 
be reduced by applying the same rules for EnC in CFSP (QMV for 
authorisation in the Council, etc.) as in the other policy fields. 
Furthermore, PESCO should be integrated into the EnC umbrella, 
a step that could incentivise further subgroup cooperation in the 
too often ‘deadlocked’ foreign, defence and security policy area. 
Proposal 3: Strengthening the Parliament’s role in EnC 
Equipping the European Parliament with the right to initiate an 
EnC project if conciliation with the Council has failed after the 
second reading of the OLP, and establishing an EnC committee 
format in the Parliament to accept, amend or reject the substan-
tive legal acts of an already authorised EnC initiative is likely to 
extend the framework dynamics beyond special legislative pro-
cedures. 
If these recommendations are implemented, taking stock of EnC 
in 2029 or 2049 may well be less of a sobering exercise than it is 
today. Although EnC will never become the ‘magic formula’ 
some envisaged it to be in the past, the framework definitely of-
fers enough potential to be ‘tweaked’ for the better – and thus 
raising the chances of realising crucial policy projects like the 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) or the per-
manent asylum-seeker distribution scheme.
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